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The selfish nature of generosity: harassment and food
sharing in primates
Jeffrey R. Stevens
Department of Ecology, Evolution, and Behavior, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN 55108, USA
Animals may share food to gain immediate or delayed fitness benefits. Previous studies of sharing have
concentrated on delayed benefits such as reciprocity, trade and punishment. This study tests an alternative
model (the harassment or sharing-under-pressure hypothesis) in which a food owner immediately benefits
because sharing avoids costly harassment from a beggar. I present an experiment that varies the potential
ability of the beggar to harass, and of the owner to defend the food, to examine the effects of harassment
on food sharing in two primate species: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri
boliviensis). For both species, high levels of harassment potential significantly increased both beggar harass-
ment and sharing by the owner. Food defensibility did not affect harassment or sharing. Interestingly,
squirrel monkeys and chimpanzees shared equally frequently with conspecifics despite a much higher
natural sharing rate in chimpanzees. These results suggest that harassment can play a significant role in
primate food sharing, providing a simple alternative to reciprocity. The selfish nature of harassment has
implications for economic, psychological and evolutionary studies of cooperative systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Historically, studies of altruism have focused on kin selec-
tion (Hamilton 1964), reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971)
and trade (Sahlins 1972) as potential explanations of gen-
erosity. Recently, however, exciting new theoretical and
empirical studies have investigated the role of sanctions
in maintaining generosity (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995;
Fehr & Ga¨chter 2000; Andreoni et al. 2003). Sanctions
involve imposing costs on a defector following a selfish act
under the assumption that, eventually, the defector will
act altruistically to avoid sanctions. Sanctions can be cat-
egorized either as harassment or punishment, depending
on whether the costs are imposed during or following
defection. Because punishment follows a selfish act, it
poses two interesting problems. First, punishment is costly
to the punisher. If the punisher does not interact with the
defector again, it pays the cost of punishing while others
may benefit from the defector switching to cooperation,
so punishing itself may be altruistic. Therefore, a temp-
tation to avoid punishing exists, and another level of pun-
ishment is needed to punish those that do not altruistically
punish (Boyd & Richerson 1992). To prevent this infinite
recursion, researchers have proposed cost-free punish-
ment (Hirshleifer & Rasmusen 1989), group selection
(Gintis 2000; Boyd et al. 2003) and transmission of con-
formity (Henrich & Boyd 2001) as mechanisms to main-
tain punishment. Second, even if the punisher does receive
selfish benefits for punishing, these benefits occur only
after the punishment, so the punisher pays an immediate
cost for a future benefit (Boyd & Richerson 1992; Clut-
ton-Brock & Parker 1995). Because the timing of costs
and benefits plays a crucial role in the evolution of
cooperation (Mesterton-Gibbons & Dugatkin 1997;
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Stevens & Gilby 2004), waiting to recoup the benefits
until defectors ‘learn’ to be generous may be difficult for
punishers, particularly if they discount future rewards.
However, imposing sanctions during the selfish act
(harassment) eliminates both problems with punishment.
When an animal harasses, it may manipulate the defector
into being generous, thereby providing an immediate bene-
fit to both individuals. Harassment, then, may provide a
selfish explanation of apparently altruistic behaviour.
The effect of harassment on generosity may account for
many instances of animal food sharing. Field observations
of chimpanzees suggest that persistent begging can force
food owners to avoid beggars or cause them to share food
(Teleki 1973; Goodall 1986). Wrangham (1975) pre-
dicted that the energetic and opportunity costs of
defending food might force owners to ‘pay’ beggars with
part of the food to avoid harassment (the ‘sharing-under-
pressure’ hypothesis). Later, Blurton Jones (1984) pro-
posed the ‘tolerated theft’ model of sharing, predicting
that satiation decreases the marginal fitness value of the
remaining resource. The owner should share to avoid costs
associated with defending the food, because the owner
values the remaining food less than a hungry newcomer.
Stevens & Stephens (2002) have extended this idea by con-
sidering how beggar harassment may impose a cost on food
owners. The model predicts that beggars should harass only
when they can offset their own cost of harassing by gaining
‘non-contingent benefits’ defined as benefits other than
shared food (e.g. dropped scraps or stolen pieces). Thus,
harassment is profitable only when the owner cannot com-
pletely defend the food. If the harassment costs imposed
on the owner are high enough, it may benefit more by shar-
ing part of the food rather than accepting the costs. There-
fore, sharing may provide selfish, immediate benefits to the
sharer by reducing the costs of defence.
Observational and experimental studies have demon-
strated food sharing in a number of species, including
insects, birds, bats, cetaceans, small mammals and
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Table 1. Predicted responses by food owners and beggars to
Partition and Divisibility treatments.
(Experimental results support all predictions except beggar
response in Partition Present/Divided food treatment and
owner response in Partition Absent/Solid food treatment.)
solid food divided food
Partition Present
beggar not harass harassa
owner defend defend
Partition Absent
beggar not harass harass
owner defendb share
a Squirrel monkeys did not harass.
b Neither chimpanzees nor squirrel monkeys defended.
primates (Feistner & McGrew 1989; Stevens & Gilby
2004). Many of these studies investigate reciprocity as a
possible explanation of sharing (Brosnan & de Waal 2002;
Hauser et al. 2003). Few studies, however, empirically test
the importance of harassment on food sharing. This study
examines harassment by testing two predictions from the
Stevens and Stephens model: (i) beggars should preferen-
tially harass when they can gain non-contingent benefits;
and (ii) owners should share more food when harassed.
To test these predictions, I manipulated food divisibility
and the beggar’s ability to harass. By manipulating food
divisibility, I controlled the owner’s ability to defend the
food and, therefore, the non-contingent benefits. Previous
work has demonstrated that chimpanzees give more food-
elicited calls (often associated with sharing food with
others) when food is divisible (Hauser et al. 1993). I
manipulated the harassment costs inflicted on the owner
by allowing the beggar to harass or by preventing harass-
ment with a mesh partition. Table 1 summarizes the pre-
dicted behaviour for both owners and beggars in each of
the experimental treatments.
To evaluate the generality of harassment, I conducted
experiments on two species of captive primates: common
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and squirrel monkeys
(Saimiri boliviensis). I used these two species because they
differ in their natural sharing rates. Chimpanzees fre-
quently share in both natural and captive situations
(Goodall 1986; de Waal 1989), whereas squirrel monkeys
do not often share food (Fragaszy & Mason 1983). If both
species exhibit effects of harassment on sharing, this
strongly supports the importance of selfish explanations of
food sharing.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Subjects
I tested common chimpanzees (P. troglodytes) at the Southwest
Foundation for Biomedical Research in San Antonio, Texas,
from May to August 2001. Subjects included 12 adult females
(ages ranged from 17 to 41 years old), paired within their social
groups (three to five members). I paired unrelated individuals
of similar age, dominance rank and food motivation to minimize
competitive asymmetries. I tested Bolivian squirrel monkeys (S.
boliviensis) from the Squirrel Monkey Breeding and Research
Resource at the University of South Alabama in Mobile,
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)
Alabama, from September to November 2001. Again, subjects
included 12 unrelated adult females (ages ranged from 4 to 9
years old), paired within their social groups (20–37 members).
All pairs remained constant throughout the experiment.
(b) Experimental apparatus and treatments
I tested the chimpanzees in adjacent outdoor cages; each meas-
uring 3.15 m × 4.56 m × 2.88 m. Metal fencing (4.8 cm × 4.8 cm
square holes) enclosed most of the cage, except for the concrete
floor and back wall. Hardware cloth covered the fencing separat-
ing the two adjacent experimental cages (1.4 cm ×1.4 cm square
holes). A 142 cm × 50 cm section of the 4.8 cm ×4.8 cm square
hole fencing was exposed, allowing the chimpanzees to interact
through the mesh.
The squirrel monkeys were tested in a 155 cm ×
64 cm × 77 cm Allentown cage, composed of stainless steel mesh
(2.3 cm × 4.3 cm rectangular holes) on all sides. A Plexiglas
sheet provided a solid floor for the cage. The 65 cm × 71 cm
partition separating the two chambers consisted of Gard’n Fence
plastic mesh (3.5 cm × 5.5 cm rectangular holes).
The experimental treatments followed a 2 × 2 repeated-meas-
ures design, including partition and food divisibility as factors.
Partition treatments manipulated the subjects’ potential to har-
ass each other by varying the presence or absence of a mesh
partition. When present, the mesh partition limited access
between the subjects by separating them in adjacent cages.
When absent, the subjects had full access to both cages and to
one another.
The second treatment factor varied the defensibility of the
food source by manipulating whether the food was either solid
or partly divided (Divisibility treatment). Owners could mono-
polize solid food because it remained intact as they consumed
it. Partly divided food (food that was cut multiple times but not
completely through) disintegrated as the owner consumed it,
thereby reducing the monopolizability of the food. I used three
bananas (a total of ca. 600 g) as food for chimpanzees and a
20 g cube of cantaloupe for squirrel monkeys.
Each subject experienced the factorial combination of these
four treatment levels as both owner and beggar (non-owner). I
conducted four replicates of these randomly ordered treatment
combinations for a total of 32 trials per pair (2 partition
levels × 2 divisibility levels × 2 ownership levels × 4 replicates).
Each pair experienced one trial per day in a randomized test
order until completing all trials. Trials occurred between 08.00
and 14.00 before regular daily feedings.
(c) Experimental procedure
Trials ran slightly differently for the two species. For chimpan-
zees, I placed the solid or partly divided bananas on the floor
ca. 20 cm from the mesh partition. I transferred the randomly
chosen owner into the cage with food and the beggar into the
adjacent cage without food. For Partition Absent trials, I opened
the door separating the two experimental cages when the owner
possessed the food. The door remained closed for Partition
Present trials.
For squirrel monkeys, I placed the randomly chosen owner
into the left chamber of the experimental cage and the beggar
in the right chamber. I placed the solid or partly divided canta-
loupe in the owner’s food dish. This configuration situated the
food near the beggar but out of her reach (10 cm from the
partition). I removed the entire partition separating the cham-
bers upon possession of the cantaloupe in Partition Absent trials
and left the partition in place for Partition Present trials.
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I operationally defined sharing and harassment loosely based
on de Waal (1997). Specifically the following.
Sharing events:
(i) collect near—beggar recovers food from within arm’s
reach of owner;
(ii) relaxed claim—beggar takes part of food that owner pos-
sesses without resistance from owner;
(iii) food giving—owner facilitates transfer of food by actively
moving it toward beggar.
Harassment events:
(i) forced claim—beggar forcefully takes food from owner;
owner resists;
(ii) unsuccessful forced claim—beggar attempts but fails to
take food from owner;
(iii) passive begging—beggar sits near and stares at owner but
no physical contact;
(iv) active begging—beggar physically contacts owner or food;
(v) attack—beggar aggressively interacts with owner.
I recorded the total number of harassment events (harassment
frequency), the total time spent harassing (harassment
duration), the total number of sharing events (sharing
frequency), the proportion of food shared by owner (proportion
shared) and the proportion of food consumed by each subject
(proportion consumed) for each trial. The onset of harassment
duration started at the first instance of a harassment event and
continued until no harassment events were observed for 5 s. All
of these measures were scored from videotape analysis. The pro-
portion shared and proportion consumed variables were arcsine,
square-root transformed for all analyses to provide more nor-
mally distributed data (Zar 1999).
3. RESULTS
(a) Non-contingent benefits of harassment
The Divisibility treatment tested whether possible non-
contingent benefits (divided food) increased harassment
by beggars. Repeated-measures analyses of variance indi-
cate that the divisibility treatment significantly influenced
chimpanzee harassment frequency (F1,11 = 7.17,
p = 0.0215) but not squirrel monkey harassment fre-
quency (F1,11 = 0.75, p = 0.4036). Therefore, chimpanzee
beggars responded to divided food by increasing their har-
assment, but squirrel monkeys did not (figure 1a).
Another measure of non-contingent benefits is whether
beggars consume more food when they harass but owners
do not share. To test this, I conducted stepwise
regressions on the effects of harassment frequency and
duration on beggar’s consumption amount in No Partition
trials in which no sharing occurred. Squirrel monkey beg-
gars consumed more food (in the absence of sharing)
when they harassed more frequently (F1,56 = 7.78,
p = 0.0072), but chimpanzee beggars did not. These
results suggest that the Divisibility treatment did manipu-
late non-contingent benefits for the chimpanzees but not
for the squirrel monkeys. The squirrel monkeys, however,
reaped benefits by consuming more when harassing.
(b) Harassment effects on sharing
Repeated-measures ANOVAs indicate that more har-
assment occurred in the No Partition treatment. As pre-
dicted, the chimpanzees harassed more frequently
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)
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Figure 1. Effects of Partition and Divisibility treatments on
harassment and sharing (means ± s.e.). (a) Both squirrel
monkeys and chimpanzees harassed more frequently in the
absence of the partition. Divisible food, however, only
increased harassment in chimpanzees. (b) Both species also
shared more in the absence of the partition. Food divisibility
did not influence sharing. Light-grey bars, solid food; dark-
grey bars, divided food.
(F1,11 = 11.24, p = 0.0064) and for longer durations
(F1,11 = 12.09, p = 0.0052) in the absence of a partition
(figure 1a). Squirrel monkeys showed similar effects
(harassment frequency: F1,11 = 24.43, p = 0.0004; harass-
ment duration: F1,11 = 12.74, p = 0.0044). Harassment fre-
quency and duration were positively correlated for both
species, indicating that longer harassment bouts did not
simply spread out the harassment events (chimpanzees:
r = 0.65, p 0.0001; squirrel monkeys: r = 0.65,
p 0.0001).
Given that the Partition treatment changed beggar
harassment levels, I tested whether this treatment also
influenced sharing by the owner. The partition influenced
sharing frequency (chimpanzees: F1,11 = 10.43, p = 0.0080;
squirrel monkeys: F1,11 = 15.96, p = 0.0021) and proportion
of food shared (chimpanzees: F1,11 = 5.38, p = 0.0406;
squirrel monkeys: F1,11 = 13.63, p = 0.0035). Thus, more
sharing occurred in the absence of the partition and in the
face of more harassment (figure 1b).
To ensure that harassment itself influenced sharing, I
examined harassment and sharing in the absence of a par-
tition. In fact, sharing did occur more frequently when
beggars harassed than when they did not for both
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chimpanzees (t94 = 3.80, p = 0.0003) and squirrel monkeys
(t94 = 2.95, p = 0.004). Stepwise multiple regressions test-
ing the effects of frequency and duration of harassment
on sharing indicate that the frequency of sharing events
increased continuously with harassment frequency in both
chimpanzees (F1,94 = 15.77, p = 0.0001) and squirrel mon-
keys (F1,94 = 5.39, p = 0.02). Also, the proportion of food
shared increased linearly with harassment duration
(chimpanzees: F1,94 = 8.51, p = 0.004; squirrel monkeys:
F1,94 = 5.17, p = 0.03). These results indicate that harass-
ment from the beggar did increase her chance of receiving
food, and more intense harassment elicited more frequent
and larger amounts of sharing.
In establishing pairs for this experiment, I chose individ-
uals of similar rank. A few of the pairs, however, did have
relative dominance differences (four chimpanzee pairs and
three squirrel monkey pairs). Although the degree of domi-
nance asymmetry was small among these pairs, I tested the
effect of relative dominance on both species. Dominance
did not affect harassment (chimpanzees: t126 =0.43,
p = 0.67; squirrel monkeys: t94 = 1.28, p = 0.20) or sharing
in either species (chimpanzees: t126 = 0.52, p = 0.61;
squirrel monkeys: t94 =0.77, p = 0.44). Therefore, my
pattern of results cannot be explained by dominant individ-
uals harassing subordinates to share. Regardless of whether
there are dominance effects, the within-subjects design of
this experiment demonstrates that harassment influences
sharing within an individual.
(c) Comparative results
Despite the similarity between these two experiments,
they were not identical. Cage size and food amount did
not scale exactly to body size. Given these and other subtle
differences, we must interpret these comparative results
with caution. Nevertheless, repeated-measures ANOVAs
reveal striking similarities and differences between chim-
panzees and squirrel monkeys. First, the species differed
in harassment frequency (F1,6 = 20.69, p = 0.004), with
squirrel monkeys harassing three times more frequently
than chimpanzees (figure 2a). Chimpanzees, however,
showed a non-significant tendency to harass for longer
durations (F1,6 = 4.05, p = 0.09).
The most noteworthy result involves sharing. Chimpan-
zees and squirrel monkeys showed no difference in sharing
frequency (F1,6 = 0.04, p = 0.85). Surprisingly, squirrel
monkeys shared a slightly larger proportion of their food
than chimpanzees (F1,6 = 6.35, p = 0.05). Thus, in this
experiment, these two species shared food equally fre-
quently, but squirrel monkeys shared more food with beg-
gars (figure 2b).
4. DISCUSSION
This study supports the harassment model predictions
of Stevens & Stephens (2002) and provides a simple set
of experimental procedures for testing other species. The
non-contingent benefits of gathering scraps from divisible
food increased harassment in chimpanzees, and harass-
ment increased the beggar’s food intake in squirrel monk-
eys. For both species, the absence of the partition
increased harassment by beggars, which increased sharing
by owners. A further analysis of No Partition trials sug-
gests that sharing increased in the presence of direct har-
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)
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Figure 2. Comparison of harassment and sharing between
chimpanzees (dark-grey bars) and squirrel monkeys (light-grey
bars) (mean ± s.e.). (a) Squirrel monkeys harassed more
frequently than chimpanzees, but chimpanzees harassed for
longer durations. (b) Surprisingly, both shared equally
frequently, and squirrel monkeys shared larger proportions of
their food. Note that the left side of each figure is described
by the left axis and the right side is described by the right axis.
assment by the beggars—owners shared more frequently
as begging intensity increased. These results generate two
conclusions: (i) beggar harassment substantially increases
food sharing; and (ii) there are few differences in sharing
rates between squirrel monkeys and chimpanzees in this
experiment (figure 2b).
Although several studies have suggested a relationship
between harassment and food sharing (Teleki 1973;
Wrangham 1975; Goodall 1986), to the best of the
author’s knowledge, this study offers the first empirical
test that manipulates the potential for harassment and
determines effects on sharing. Therefore, the immediate,
selfish benefits of reducing the costs of harassment directly
influenced sharing. By imposing costs, beggars manipulate
the owners’ fitness benefits of defending a resource. To
avoid these costs, food owners must relinquish part of the
food that they possess.
(a) Implications of harassment effects
Chimpanzees frequently share food in both natural and
captive settings (Feistner & McGrew 1989). In some
populations of chimpanzees, food owners almost always
share part of a carcass with others following hunts (I. C.
Gilby, unpublished data). Chimpanzees also have food
calls that are given when individuals find both divisible
and non-divisible foods (Hauser et al. 1993). By contrast,
squirrel monkeys rarely share food in the wild or in
captivity (Fragaszy & Mason 1983), and have no food
calls. Despite these apparent differences in sharing rates
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and vocal behaviour, chimpanzees and squirrel monkeys
share equally often, and squirrel monkeys actually share
larger proportions of food in this experimental situation
(figure 2b). Because harassment elicited sharing in both
chimpanzees and squirrel monkeys, it could provide a gen-
eral explanation of sharing.
Harassment is a parsimonious and broadly applicable
explanation of sharing for several reasons. First, sharing
provides immediate, selfish benefits for the owner by
avoiding costly harassment. Owners do not act altruisti-
cally in the short term and wait for future repayment as
they do in reciprocally altruistic interactions. These find-
ings support a growing body of mutualistic explanations
of cooperation (Clements & Stephens 1995; Grinnell et
al. 1995; Clutton-Brock et al. 1999). Second, harassment
does not require complex cognitive skills. Unlike recip-
rocity, individuals need not track discounted future
rewards, debts owed, favours given or the likelihood of
reciprocation (Stevens & Hauser 2004). Instead, natural
selection simply favours individuals that donate food in
such a way as to avoid net costs. Finally, harassment does
not require special relationships between owner and beg-
gar. In instances of kin-selected food sharing, sharing
occurs only within a limited set of related individuals. In
reciprocal altruism, individuals must recognize and inter-
act with the same individuals to track reciprocation. In
the harassment paradigm, however, individuals need not
recognize each other, much less interact repeatedly.
Indeed, individuals that have never met and will never
meet again may share food.
Harassment may explain many instances of sharing for
a number of taxa. To date, researchers have reported har-
assment and sharing in only a few species, most notably
chimpanzees (Stevens & Gilby 2004). Its role in chimpan-
zee food sharing, however, has probably been vastly
underestimated. For example, de Waal (1989) and
Mitani & Watts (2001) both discounted the effects of
observed harassment and concluded that reciprocity and
trade maintained sharing. In addition, Stanford et al.
(1994) proposed correlational evidence that males may
trade food for sex by sharing more frequently with sexually
receptive females. Previously, however, Teleki (1973) pro-
vided an alternative explanation of Stanford’s results by
demonstrating that receptive females harass food owners
more often. Therefore, patterns of reciprocal sharing or
trade may result from reciprocal harassment rather than
reciprocal altruism (Stevens & Cushman 2004). If individ-
ual A frequently begs from individual B and vice versa,
they will show a reciprocal pattern, but this pattern can
be explained by immediate, selfish benefits rather than by
reciprocally altruistic benefits. By underestimating harass-
ment, studies of sharing may ignore a potentially basic
mechanism of sharing and misinterpret reciprocal sharing
patterns. This, of course, does not imply that harassment
is always the best explanation of sharing or that it excludes
other explanations—it could act in concert with recip-
rocity. Rather, harassment must be either ruled out, or
statistically controlled for, before invoking more complex
explanations such as reciprocity, trade and meat-for-sex.
(b) Natural harassment
These laboratory results on captive species reveal that
harassment can influence sharing in primates; however,
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (2004)
they do not demonstrate the importance of harassment in
natural sharing situations. For chimpanzees, many studies
of wild populations have verified the frequency of harass-
ment (Teleki 1973; Wrangham 1975; Goodall 1986).
Critically, a recent study focusing on harassment and shar-
ing in wild chimpanzees corroborated the experimental
results described here (I. C. Gilby, unpublished data).
Gilby found that harassment predicted sharing patterns
better than grooming frequency, association levels and
female sexual receptivity in chimpanzees at Gombe
National Park. No evidence of sharing exists for wild
populations of squirrel monkeys. Evidence from another
primate species, however, validates the importance of har-
assment in natural sharing situations. Hauser (1992)
described scenarios in which rhesus macaques (Macaca
mulatta) discovered food sources and could either with-
hold or give recruitment calls. If other monkeys discovered
an individual that did not call, they chased and attacked
the non-caller. If the individual called, others shared the
food in relative peace. Interestingly, female callers con-
sumed more food on average than female non-callers, sug-
gesting that calling (and thereby sharing) offered higher
benefits than not calling and facing harassment.
The role of harassment in human food sharing remains
unclear. Blurton Jones developed the original tolerated
theft model to describe patterns of food sharing in
humans. Evidence for tolerated theft in human societies
comes from work on turtle hunting by the Meriam and
large-animal hunting by the Hadza. Bliege-Bird & Bird
(1997) found that defending turtle meat is costly to Mer-
iam hunters and that the marginal fitness value decreases
with resource size. Similarly, Hawkes (1993, 2000) sug-
gests that Hadza hunters share large kills because not shar-
ing is too costly. Despite these examples, many
anthropologists argue that tolerated theft is relatively
uncommon in human food-sharing contexts (Kaplan &
Hill 1985; Gurven 2004). Many investigations of tolerated
theft, however, focus on overly strict assumptions and pre-
dictions that are less restrictive in the recent Stevens &
Stephens (2002) model of harassment.
(c) Harassment and punishment
Harassment and punishment are closely related models
of cooperation, differing in the timing of benefits to the
harasser or punisher. Although models of punishment sug-
gest that it may be evolutionarily stable (Boyd & Richerson
1992; Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Gintis 2000),
empirical evidence is quite rare in non-human animals.
Many of the previously touted examples probably fall
under harassment rather than punishment because of
immediate benefits associated with the sanctions. Perhaps
cognitive constraints make punishment difficult for non-
human animals to implement. For punishment to be prof-
itable the return benefit must be large, or the delay until
the next interaction must be small, to balance the effect
of temporal discounting of future cooperative benefits
(Stephens et al. 2002). In addition, learning rate is critical
to the efficacy of punishment. To create an association
between punishment and the uncooperative behaviour,
the temporal delay between the uncooperative behaviour
and the punishment must be short and the number of
learning events (future cooperative interactions) must be
relatively large. By contrast, harassment circumvents these
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cognitive constraints by applying the aversive stimulus
during the uncooperative behaviour; therefore, co-
operation provides immediate benefits. However, harass-
ment may influence future as well as current cooperation,
suggesting that it may be a precursor to punishment in
some situations. This could have important implications
for the evolution of punishment in many types of cooper-
ative situations.
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